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The Federal Deficit as a Business
Cycle Stabilizer
The federal surplus or deficit, or rather the change in it, has long
been considered a stabilizing factor in business cycles. Its stabilizing
properties are partly automatic, as when tax collections go down
during a recession with a decline in incomes and profits or when
expenditures go up because of a rise, say, in unemployment compen-
sation. They can also be partly deliberate, as when tax rates are cut
during a recession or the duration of unemployment benefits is ex-
tended and expenditures thereby increased. These stabilizing prop-
erties can also work in reverse during a business cycle expansion and
help to dampen the inflation in the price level that usually accom-
panies rapid growth.
In order to determine how well or poorly the large deficits of
recent years have worked in these respects, some consideration of
the past record of deficits during business cycles is essential. To make
this record meaningful, I think the commonly cited dollar figures
should be adjusted to allow for the fact that the price level has risen
substantially. A dollar of deficit now is not worth the same in real
goods and services as a dollar of deficit ten or twenty years ago. It
is desirable also to allow for the fact that the economy has grown
substantially in real terms. A deficit of a billion dollars in a trillion
dollar economy is not the same as in a half-trillion dollar economy,
even if both the deficit and the economy are measured in constant
prices.
Statement presented before the Committee to Investigate a Balanced Federal
Budget, Democratic Research Organization, March 25, 1976.
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Thefigures in Table 8—1, then, measure both the deficit and GNP
in constant (1972) prices and compare the change in the real deficit h
with the change in real GNP.1 They cover six recessions, starting
with 1948—1949 and ending with 1973—1975. SIC
8-
Details apart, several points stand out: t
1. The real deficit rose in every recession but one, 1953—1954.
2. The increase of $52 billion in the real federal deficit in the
most recent recession was more than twice as large as in any of the
five previous recessions. The allowance for rising prices makes a 19
considerable difference—in current dollars, the 1973—1975 increase de
was more than six times as large as the increase in, say, 1948—1949. ce
3. Relative to the decline in GNP of $47 billion, however, the rise
in the deficit was relatively modest compared with previous reces- P1
sions. Allowing for the size of the recession makes a vast difference aci
in how one views the size of the deficit. SeC
4. The price level was relatively stable during the first four reces-
sions, but rose sharply in the last two. Note that changes are mea- exj
sured over a two year interval in 1973—1975, but over one year in thi
the earlier recessions because they did not last as long. Even though dei
the rise in the real deficit in 1973—1975 was not large relative to Tb
the decline in real GNP, the rise in prices was extraordinarily great. COI
Infact, it is clear from these figures as well as other price indexes
that price increases during recessions have been getting progressively clii
stronger since 1948. 19




















1957 to 1958 +19 —1 +2
1960to1961 ÷10 +18a +1
1969to1970 +23 —4 +5
1973to1975 +52 —47 +19
a0
aquarterly basis, real GNP declined during these recessions, but the declines
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Somuch for a quick review of recession experience. One cannot,
LN however, determine whether the deficit moved in a stabilizing man-
Icit ner by looking at recessions alone. What happened during expan-
ing sions is equally relevant, and the contrast at least as important. Table
8—2 presents the record for the six expansions that took place be-
tween the recessions.
Several points are worth noting:
he 1. The real deficit fell during every expansion but one, 1949— he 1953. Coupled with the result for recessions, we can say that the
a deficit has nearly always moved in a stabilizing manner, rising in re-
ase cession, falling in expansion.
2. The declines in the real deficit durihg expansions have been
S picayune relative to the rise in real GNP. The real deficit has not
acted nearly as powerfully to constrain expansion as to constrain
recession.
es- 3. The rise in the price level has generally been far greater in
ea- expansion than in recession. There are, of course, many reasons for
in this, including the obvious one that expansions are periods when
gh demand is rising. But the point just mentioned may also be a factor.
to The small relative declines in the deficit during expansions probably
at contributed to the greater rise in the price level at those times.
xe 4. Indeed, since the restraint on the price level imposed by a de-
'ely dining deficit has been getting relatively smaller, on the whole, since
1946, it is not implausible that this has carried over into the subse-
quent recessions, thus helping to explain the increasing vigor of price
increases during recessions.
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Source: Table 8A-1.130 Business Cycles
Towhat extent is this record of countercyclical behavior of the
federal deficit attributable to discretionary policy on the part of the
Congress and the executive branch and to what extent has it been
the automatic result of the cyclical swings in the economy? The esti-
mates of the full employment budget help to answer this question,
since they indicate roughly what the change in the deficit would have
been had the economy remained at a high level instead of lapsing
into recession every few years. They enable us to break down the
change in the deficit into an automatic component and a "policy-
determined" component, the latter being the estimated change in the
deficit due to tax or expenditure changes other than those arising
directly from recession or recovery. It is recognized, of course, that
the so-called policy-determined changes (i.e., change in the full
employment surplus or deficit) are adopted for a wide variety of
reasons, many of which have nothing to do with stabilization. The
figures are given in Table 8—3.
From this we learn that:
1. Stabilizing changes in the deficit (i.e., increases during recession
and reductions during expansion) have been the rule for both the
automatic and the policy-determined changes.
2. Movements in a stabilizing direction have generally been larger
in the automatic than in the policy-determined components of the
deficit. The four exceptions (out of eleven), where the policy-deter-
mined changes were larger—in the stabilizing direction—than the
automatic changes all occurred before 1961. Since 1961, the auto-
matic have far exceeded the policy-determined changes.
3. The policy-determined increase in the real deficit during the
recession of 1973—1975 amounted to only $13 billion (in 1972
prices), a small figure compared with the decline of $47 billion in
real GNP.
4. The policy-determined reduction in the real deficit during the
expansion of 1970—1973 was miniscule, and in the expansion before
that (1961—1969), the policy-determined component did not decline
at all. The price level rose substantially during these expansion pe-
riods, and the policy-determined component of the deficit had no
net restraining influence whatever. By contrast, in the two preceding
expansions (1954—1957 and 1958—1960), the policy-determined
reductions in the deficit were quite substantial, and the price level
rose very little.
Let me now sum up these observations on the federal deficit as a








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a132 Busine Cycles .1
almostalways moved in the right direction, rising in recession, falling
in expansion. The magnitude of these movements has been signifi-
cantly large during recessions but insignificant during expansions,
which is where the big increases in the price level have occurred.2
We cannot, therefore, depend on automatic reductions in the deficit
during expansions to have any appreciable effect in stabilizing prices..
Thepolicy-determined changes in the deficit have also, by and large, .
operatedin a stabilizing direction, but here again, the antirecession
changes have been more consistently consequential than the anti-
inflation changes. Since we are now, once again, in the expansion-
inflation phase of the business cycle, the question before policymak-
ers is whether to enhance the automatic tendency of the economy to
reduce the deficit.
(Note added August 4, 1978) During the two and a half years
since this paper was presented, the United States has continued to
enjoy an economic expansion, and the deficit has reacted in much
the same way as in previous expansions. The real deficit (i.e., in 1972
dollars) has declined slightly, from $56 billion in 1975 to $38 billion
in the first quarter of 1978 (at annual rate). The $18 billion drop in
the real deficit compares with a $158 billion rise in real GNP during
the same period. As in previous expansions, the decline in the deficit
has been miniscule compared with the rise of GNP or compared with
the increase in the deficit during the preceding recession. Meanwhile
the price level (GNP deflator) has risen 15 percent, very nearly the
same as the rise during the 1970—1973 expansion. The deficit has
again failed to offset in any significant way the inflationary pressures
that have been building up during the expansion.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
1.The figures used in the Tables 8-1 through 8-3 and 8A-1 are for calendar
years and pertain to the federal surplus or deficit as defined in the national in-
come accounts. Corresponding figures for the unified budget, for fiscal years, are
shown in the other tables of the Appendix.
2.It can be argued that a business-cycle-stabilizing mechanism like the defi-
cit should not operate in a wholly symmetrical manner during expansions and
recessions, because it is desirable to stimulate growth. Furthermore, fiscal stimu-
lus may be desirable during the initial recovery phase of an expansion but not
later. In a fuller analysis, one should take these points into account, but I do not
believe that they would substantially alter the basic results presented here. For
an alternative treatment see Chapter 15.I
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